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THE EFFECTS OF METROPOLITAN JOB GROWTH
ON THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY INCOME
Timothy J. Bartik
W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Abstract
This paper examines how a metropolitan area's job growth affects its income distribution.
The research uses annual Current Population Survey data on the income distribution in different
metropolitan areas from 1979 through 1988. Faster metropolitan job growth increases real family
income in the lowest income quintile by a significantly greater percentage than for the average
family. Metropolitan job growth also increases the value of property owned by upper income
quintiles, but property value effects are not large enough to offset the progressive effects of
growth on labor income. Simulations indicate that economic development programs to increase
metropolitan job growth will have a progressive effect if the cost per job created is low, and these
costs are financed by personal taxes. But economic development programs with a high cost per
job created, or financed by cutting social welfare programs, will have a net negative effect on the
lowest income quintile.
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THE EFFECTS OF METROPOLITAN JOB GROWTH
ON THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY INCOME
I.

Introduction

The effects of metropolitan employment growth on the income distribution have received
little attention from researchers. Income distribution is a perennial central issue in economics,
and some researchers have looked at national business cycle effects upon the income distribution
(Blank, 1989; Blank and Blinder, 1986; Blinder and Esaki, 1978). Local labor markets have been
the subject of increased research attention in recent years, and some researchers have examined
how metropolitan employment growth affects wages (e.g., Eberts and Stone, 1988; Bartik, 1991).
But no research has directly linked local labor market trends with income distribution issues.
One plausible argument is that metropolitan employment growth will worsen the income
distribution, due to the phenomenon of capitalization. In the long-run, it could be argued, faster
metropolitan employment growth will be offset by population in-migration, driving up land
prices, with little effect on real wages or unemployment. A well-known essay by Louis Winnick
some years ago used this argument to support the proposition that people rather than places should
be the target of anti-poverty policies: "real estate owners, banks, retailers, and utilities are surer
beneficiaries (from new industry) than are the unemployed coal miners or loggers who are less
likely to get the jobs in the new plants than are new in-migrants, younger and with more
appropriate skills" (Winnick, 1966).
But there are persuasive arguments for why labor market benefits of faster metropolitan
employment growth may be significant and persistent. People are reluctant to move; going back
to Adam Smith, economists have been aware that "a man is of all sorts of luggage the most
difficult to be transported" (Smith, 1776, Book I, chapter VIII). Furthermore, faster metropolitan
employment growth may provide current residents with labor market experience and insider status
that will increase their long-run labor market success. To use the current jargon, local labor
market equilibria may be subject to hysteresis effects (Cross, 1988).
Who benefits from faster metropolitan employment growth is thus a open question, whose
answer is uncertain from a theoretical perspective. The empirical results presented here suggest
that faster metropolitan employment growth significantly increases the income share of the lowest
income quintile. The poor's labor income gains offset the rich's capital gains.
These findings are relevant to state and local economic development policies. Politicians
promise that these policies will help the unemployed and the poor. Simulations using my results
indicate that this promise may be fulfilled, but only under certain conditions: if the cost per job
created is low, and if these costs are not financed too regressively.
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II.

Model and Data
The model estimated in this study is simple. The equations estimated are of the form
(1)

%Dyimt = B0 + Bt + C(L)gmt + eimt.

%Dyimt is the percentage change in mean family income for quintile i in metropolitan area m from
year t-1 to t; Bt represents a vector of dummy variables for each year; gmt is percentage
employment growth from year t-1 to t for metropolitan area m; eimt is the disturbance term. C(L)
indicates that up to ten lagged values of gmt are also included--that is, growth trends from up to
ten years ago are allowed to affect income trends today--with each lag allowed to have its own
coefficient. To estimate equation (1), all metropolitan areas and years in the data are pooled.
Variants of equation (1) look at overall mean family income, or at income of different types (e.g.,
wage and salary income, self-employment income).
The time dummies included in equation (1) imply that this study is focusing not on the
effects of national job trends, but on the effects of a metropolitan area's job trends. Including
time dummies is equivalent to all variables being differenced from their time period means.
Hence, equation (1) is trying to explain variations across metropolitan areas in income distribution
trends as a function of variations of metropolitan area job growth from the national average.
Including more and more lagged values of the employment variables would eventually
make all the estimates statistically insignificant. Hence, the reported results sometimes focus on
the specification with the "optimal lag length". The "optimal lag length" is defined as the lag
length, among the 11 lag lengths tested (from zero to ten lagged years in the employment
variables), that minimizes the "Akaike Information Criterion" (Amemiya, 1985). The AIC is a
standard model selection criterion that selects the model that explains the most with the least. The
AIC is reduced for models with a lower sum of squared errors or fewer explanatory variables.
I also report estimates for the most general specifications estimated in this study, which allow
effects for employment growth as long as ten years ago.
The data for the model's dependent variables come from March Current Population Survey
tapes. The surveys included run from March 1980 through March 1989; each CPS reports family
income information for the preceding year. To calculate metropolitan area quintile incomes, I
include all families in identified metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs); from March 1980 to March
1985, only 44 MSAs were identified, but an additional 192 MSAs are identified from March 1986
onwards. All types of CPS families are included in the analysis, including unrelated individuals,
and "unrelated subfamilies".1

1

"Related subfamilies" are counted by the CPS as part of the main family in the household, and I also follow this
convention.
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For each MSA and year, I order families by income, and calculate the mean family income
for each quintile of the MSA's income distribution. These quintiles are separately defined for
each MSA and year. I also calculate mean family income for the MSA, and the mean of various
types of family income for each quintile and the MSA. These estimated means are used to
calculate equation (1)'s dependent variables.
The annual aggregate MSA employment data that are used, covering 1969 through 1988,
come from the Regional Economic Information System of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The aggregate employment data use a consistent set of MSA definitions.
The models and data used in this study have two important limitations. The first limitation
is that the CPS omits much family income. In-kind transfers are omitted. Capital gains on real
estate and other assets are also omitted. Personal income of a given type(such as wage and salary
income) is top-coded at $99,999. Finally, survey respondents may lie.
I only try here to deal with two of these problems, the omission of capital gains, and the
top-coding of some income. Some of the tables report the annual income equivalent of growthinduced capital gains on real estate. In addition, some tables adjust the income gain of the top
quintile to account for top-coding. Ten percent or less of the total income of the highest income
quintile is top-coded on average.2 If top-coded income increases at the same rate as non-top
coded income for the highest income quintile, then the reported results need only be modestly
adjusted upwards. For example, if 10% of the income of the highest income quintile is topcoded, the reported effects of growth on quintile income need only be adjusted upwards by around
11%. The problem with this adjustment is that because we fail to observe top-coded income, its
response to metropolitan growth is unknown.
The second limitation of the model and data is that in-migration and out-migration from
metropolitan areas make this study's estimates more difficult to interpret. For policy purposes,
we would like to know how metropolitan job growth affects the economic fortunes of a given
family. But the CPS data used here is simply a collection of cross-sections of the families in an
MSA during a particular year. The composition of the MSA population may change over time
due to growth. These compositional effects of growth can not be distinguished in this study from
the effects of growth on the incomes of a given family. For example, if MSA job growth is
observed to increase average MSA family income, we can not tell in this study the extent to which
this is due to MSA job growth causing the income of the original residents to increase, or whether
MSA job growth is attracting families with higher incomes as in-migrants.

2

Based on analysis of the March 1988 computer tape, 10.15% of top quintile wage and salary income, 2.74% of selfemployment income, and zero dividend income, was top-coded. I did not examine other income categories for topcoding. Thus, less than 10% of the upper income quintile's income was top-coded in March 1988, and this year was
one of the last years in my sample, when top-coding would be expected to be the greatest problem.
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This limitation can only be fully addressed by using other data bases that follow the same
individuals over time. However, in my previous work, (Bartik, 1991), I found that the estimated
earnings, wage and unemployment effects of MSA growth were not sensitive to whether shortterm residents (less than five years of residence in the MSA) were included in the sample.
III.

Estimates of Effects of MSA Job Growth on CPS-Measured Income

Table 1 shows the estimated long-run effect of employment growth--the sum of all the
coefficients on the employment variables--on the total income of different quintiles. The optimal
lag length for all quintiles is zero lags. The long-run effects of employment growth on family
incomes are not significantly different from the short-run effects.
Column (3) in Table 1 presents these estimated employment shock effects from the zero
lag specification. The percentage effect of a shock to metropolitan area employment is greatest
for the lowest income quintile: compared to the average family, the percentage effect for the
lowest income quintile is twice as great. Percentage effects of employment shocks are smallest
for the highest income quintile. These effects on the highest income quintile may be biased
downward somewhat by top-coding.
Column (4) in Table 1 shows the estimated percentage effect of employment shocks on the
income share of each quintile, using the optimal lag length specification. The percentage effect
on a quintile's share will be approximately equal to the difference between the shock's effect on
that quintile's income and its effect on average family income.3 Column (4) shows that an MSA
employment shock increases the income share of the lowest income quintile by an amount that is
statistically significant. Hence, an MSA employment shock has a statistically significant greater
percentage effect on the income of the lowest income quintile than for the average family. The
percentage effects of MSA employment shocks on the other four quintiles fail to statistically differ
from effects for the average family.
These results do not imply that the lowest income quintile gains the most from
metropolitan growth in absolute dollar amounts. Because the income share of the lowest income
quintile is so low (3.91% from column (2) of Table 1), even large percentage effects represent
small dollar effects. The lowest income quintile receives only 8.05% of the total MSA nominal
income gain from a shock to job growth.4 However, any usual definitions of the "progressivity"

3

When using a logarithmic measure of percentage change, this equality will be exact if all equations are estimated
by OLS. The equality is not exact in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1 because all estimates are corrected for serial
correlation.
4

This share of the total MSA nominal income gain is equal to the income share of the lowest income quintile, times
the ratio of the percentage effect on the lowest income quintile to the effect on the average family. Thus, 8.05 =.0391
* (1.415/.687) * 100.
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of some event would define the greater percentage effect on the lowest income quintile as
increasing the progressivity of the family income distribution.
These results are robust. Column (5) shows the estimated long-run percentage effects of
an MSA employment shock in the most general specification, with ten lagged years of the
employment growth variables. The estimated effects of an MSA employment shock are lower
in this more general specification. But except for the highest income quintile, the estimated
effects are still statistically significant. Furthermore, the decline in the estimated effects is
modest compared to their imprecision.
Column (6) reports estimated long-run percentage effects with percentage change defined
differently. The previous columns use as a dependent variable the change in the logarithm of
mean family income. Column (6) is based on a specification which uses as a dependent variable
the absolute dollar change in mean family income for a quintile, divided by that quintile's mean
income over all MSAs and years. The results are insensitive to these different functional form
assumptions. This alternative definition of percentage change is used below to examine changes
in different types of income for particular quintiles. In examining different income types, a
logarithmic specification is infeasible because particular income types frequently are zero or
negative for a particular MSA, year, and quintile.
These employment shock effects on nominal income imply positive effects on real income.
In previous research, the long-run consumer price effect of a 1% shock to a metropolitan area's
employment was estimated to be between .170% and .200% (Bartik, 1991). Direct testing of the
statistical significance of real income effects is only possible for the twenty-five MSAs in the
sample for which the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports annual inflation. Column (7)
reports these real income effects. Except for the highest income quintile, all these real income
effects of an employment shock are significantly greater than zero.5
Table 2 reports the percentage effects of a shock to a metropolitan area's employment on
the eleven types of income reported in the CPS. Effects are reported for the optimal lag
specification for each type of income. Estimates for a ten lag specification are similar.
How different types of income respond to employment shocks is a useful check on whether
this empirical research is sensible. For example, if all the positive effects of metropolitan job
growth came from an increase in farm income, the results should be doubted. Furthermore,
different types of income may have different social value. For example, welfare income may be
less socially valued than wage and salary income.

5

These estimated real income effects are somewhat smaller than would be expected from subtracting .200 from the
estimates in column (3). Additional estimation indicates that these smaller real income estimates are largely due to these
25 MSAs having somewhat smaller nominal income effects than the entire sample. But the differences in nominal income
effects between the 25 MSAs and all other MSAs are statistically insignificant.
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The estimates in table 2 seem sensible. Most of an employment shock's effect on total
income is due to its effect on wage and salary income. The contribution of the wage effect to the
total income effect is the product of the wage effect and the wage and salary share of total
income. This product in Table 2, for the long-run results, is equal to .847 (=.7441 times 1.138),
which is 127% of the change in total income of .665.6
The estimates provide evidence that an increase in MSA employment postpones
retirement. In the long-run, an increase in MSA employment is associated with lower social
security and retirement income.
The estimates provide evidence that an employment shock causes some declines in public
and private transfers. Child support and other income, which includes private transfers, declines
in both the short-run and long-run. Public assistance and unemployment insurance income both
decline in the short-run, although only the unemployment insurance decline is statistically
significant. In the long-run, unemployment insurance income increase. The increase could
reflect the positive effects of metropolitan growth on state and local tax bases. In addition, a
healthier local economy may increase the percentage of the unemployed eligible for UI.
The estimates also suggest that an increase in MSA employment reduces interest income,
particularly in the short-run. Perhaps MSA growth causes individuals to reduce precautionary
saving, using the proceeds to increase consumption, buy a house, or invest in other local real
estate assets.
Table 3 reports estimates of the long-run percentage effects of metropolitan area growth
on different types of income for the lowest income quintile, the highest income quintile, and the
average family. For these three groups, I report the share of each type of income in total income,
the estimated percentage effect of growth on that type of income, and the contribution of that type
of income to the increase in total income (the product of the first two numbers). To ensure
consistency among the various estimates, all estimates are based on the most general specification,
with ten lags in the employment growth variables. The highest and lowest income quintiles are
highlighted because the rich and the poor are of special interest, and growth effects differ the
most from the average for these two quintiles.
Wage and salary income explains most of the differences between the average family and
the lowest income quintile. Wage and salary income is a smaller share of income for the lowest
income quintile than for the average family. Other things equal, growth's effects on wage and
salary income should increase total income less for the lowest income quintile. But compared to
the average family, the lowest income quintile experiences growth effects on wage and salary
income that are almost three times as great in percentage terms. These greater percentage effects
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For example, in the 0-lag results, .7441 times .951 is equal to .707, which is 108% of the total income effect of
.665.
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outweigh the smaller share of wage and salary income, and wage and salary effects tend to help
the lowest income quintile compared to the average family.
Wage and salary income also explains most of the differences in growth effects between
the average family and the highest income quintile. Wage and salary income increases more
slowly for the highest income quintile than for other quintiles. Social Security income, retirement
income, unemployment insurance income, child support and other income, and interest income,
also respond more in percentage terms for the highest income quintile, but these differences
explain little about why the highest income quintile benefits less from growth than the average
family.
IV.

Including Real Estate Capital Gains in Estimates of the Real Income Distribution Effects
of Metropolitan Growth

Omitted from the estimates above are growth-induced increases in real estate values. Land
ownership is concentrated in upper income groups, so if real estate capital gains are large
enough, the overall benefits of metropolitan growth could be distributed regressively.
Table 4 reports estimates of how metropolitan growth affects the distribution of real
income, including real estate capital gains. The table focuses on the effects of metropolitan
growth on the local income distribution; hence, nominal income gains and nominal real estate
capital gains are adjusted for local price changes, and effects on real estate are only considered
if it is locally owned. The conservative assumption is made, however, that most real estate is
locally owned.
Nominal property values are assumed to respond to a 1% metropolitan growth shock with
an increase of .451%, based on my book's estimates of how metropolitan growth affects the value
of owner-occupied housing (Bartik, 1991). Nominal property value increases and nominal income
increases are adjusted separately for each quintile for the rate of increase of overall local prices.
Each quintile's price increases are based on Consumer Expenditure Survey estimates of the
quintile's pattern of expenditures (percentage of expenditures on housing, food, etc.) and on
estimates of how growth affects the price of different local goods (Bartik, 1991).7

7

Raw consumer expenditure shares were taken from Table 715, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1990).
These categories do not exactly match those used in the U.S. CPI. As a rough adjustment, I multiplied each quintile's
expenditure share by the ratio of the CPI relative importance weight (CPI Appendix 2, p. 187, BLS Handbook of
Methods, 1988) to the average consumer expenditure share from the Abstract table. These quintile expenditure
shares were then adjusted to ensure that they summed to 1.0. The price effects of 1% growth estimated in my book, by
expenditure category, were: .34 (Shelter); .147 (food); .072 (transportation); .025 (fuel); .08 (furnishings); .136
(apparel); .139 (medical care), .114 (entertainment), and .137 (other). The resulting price changes, for quintile 1 through
quintile 5, were: .177; .169; .167; .166; .172. The overall price change for the average family is estimated as .170.
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The total value of residential real estate is taken from Tax Capacity of the Fifty States
(Table 5-26, 1990). Total values of corporate and non-corporate business real estate, and the
division of residential real estate into rental and owner-occupied, are calculated from the Survey
of Current Business (p. 101, 1990).8 The ratios of total real estate values to CPS income are
calculated based on CPS income figures from Current Population Reports (1988 figures on p. 55
of the 1990 edition). 75% of corporate real estate is assumed to be locally owned; all other types
of real estate are assumed to be 100% locally owned.
Corporate and rental real estate capital gains are allocated across quintiles based on CPS
estimates of each quintile's share of rental and dividend income.9 Non-corporate business real
estate capital gains are allocated across quintiles based on CPS estimates of each quintile's share
of self-employment income. Home-ownership capital gains are allocated across quintiles based
on CPS estimates of the homeownership percentage in each quintile, and projections from the
1979 Annual Housing Survey on how the ratio of owner-occupied home value to income varies
across the income distribution.10 Based on these calculations, owner-occupied home values are
distributed more progressively than current income. The ratio of home value to current income
is high enough for low current income homeowners to offset the lower homeownership
percentages in lower income groups.
Finally, all these capital gains are made equivalent to real income effects using a 10%
discount rate: the calculated real capital gains are multiplied by .10 for all quintiles.
Even with real estate capital gains, the overall benefits of metropolitan growth are still
distributed progressively. The lowest income quintile gains the most, and the highest income
quintile gains the least. Real estate capital gains are distributed regressively overall, but are not
large enough to offset the progressive effects on other types of income.
These simulation results are unlikely to be overturned except by changes in the maintained
assumptions that seem implausible. For example, suppose we assume that all real estate is owned
by the highest income quintile, real estate prices increase in inflation-adjusted terms by twice as
much as estimated above, and the appropriate discount rate is 20%. Even under these extreme
assumptions, capital gains on local real estate would only add .682% to the real income of the
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Figures for structure value are adjusted upwards by 1/(1-.8) to derive total structure and land value, on the
assumption that land is 20% of total real estate value.
9
There may be some double-counting here, as some of the increased capital gains may be reflected in increased rental
and dividend income. Hence, the estimates presented here may exaggerate the effects of real estate capital gains on the
income distributional effects of growth.
10

A regression was run of the median home value to income ratio for homeowners, for various groups, from the 1979
AHS, on the average percentile of the income distribution for different income groups. The regression results were then
used to predict this ratio for each of the quintiles.
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highest income quintile. The percentage effect of growth would still be greatest for the lowest
income quintile, although the highest income quintile would be close behind.11
V.

Net Distributional Effects of Policies to Increase MSA Growth

Although metropolitan job growth has progressive distributional effects, state and local
governments may find it difficult to help the poor using economic development policies.
Economic development policies have costs to local taxpayers. Because state and local tax systems
are generally believed to be regressive, it is quite possible that state and local policies to promote
job growth will have a distributional effect, including tax costs, that is regressive.
I consider three scenarios varying in the assumed costs of economic development policies,
and how they are financed. The first and second scenarios assume that an economic development
subsidy which reduces business costs, via tax abatements or other subsidies, by an amount
equivalent to 1% of average state and local business taxes, will cause a long-run employment
increase of .24%. A long-run elasticity of .24% of local business activity with respect to state
and local business taxes is the average across 46 studies summarized in Bartik (1991).
The first scenario goes on to assume that these economic development subsidies are paid
for through increased personal state and local taxes. To make the appropriate calculations, I
assume the business share of state and local taxes is 33.9% (p. 63, U.S. Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations, 1981), and use figures on how state and local tax burdens vary
across different income quintiles reported in Pechman (1985).12
The second scenario assumes that the economic development subsidies are financed
through across the board reductions in welfare payments. CPS data on welfare income by quintile
are used to allocate the burden of this financing scheme.
The third scenario returns to financing economic development with higher personal taxes,
but assumes that the subsidy cost to create one job is higher. A puzzling finding in business
location studies is that estimated elasticities of local business activity with respect to wages, and
with respect to state and local business taxes, are often similar, even though labor costs are
11

To derive this re-estimate, sum the real estate effects for the average family in Table 4, divide by .4483 (to express
as a percentage of the top quintile's income), multiply by .279/.281 (to account for the slightly higher inflation rate for
the top quintile), and then multiply by four to reflect the higher discount rate and the larger effect of growth on real
estate prices.
12
Pechman estimates of state and local tax burden by income decile are taken from variant 3b on p. 61; these figures
are adjusted upwards to be percentages of unadjusted money income based on Pechman data on p. 44 of relationship of
unadjusted money income to adjusted family income by quintile. State and local personal tax burden by quintile is
assumed to be 66.1% of these total state and local burden figures; this implicitly assumes that the distribution
of the state and local personal tax burden is the same as the distribution of the state and local business tax burden. While
this assumption is probably not true, it is unclear in which direction it errs.
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around fifteen times state and local business tax costs (Bartik, 1991). If business location patterns
are based on relative costs, we would expect state and local business tax elasticities to be around
1/15th of wage elasticities.13 Average elasticities of state and local business activity with respect
to wages are around -.60, so the implied elasticity with respect to state and local business taxes
would be -.04 (Bartik, 1991). Scenario three is based on this -.04 elasticity, which increases the
cost per job created by fifteen times.
Table 5 reports the gross benefits, gross costs, and net benefits of economic development
policies under these three scenarios. The net efficiency and distributional effects of economic
development policies are obviously quite sensitive to assumptions about financing. If the cost per
job created is relatively low (scenarios one and two), then on average local families gain from the
economic development policy. But with a high cost per job created (scenario three), local
families on average lose from an economic development policy. Even if the cost per job created
is low, cutting welfare to pay for economic development subsidies (scenario two) results in
enormous net losses for the poor. Growth's benefits are progressively distributed, but welfare
payments are even more progressively distributed.
Exercises of this sort are subject to manipulation to get whatever results one wants. But
the finding that net benefits and their distribution are quite sensitive to the cost per job created,
and how that cost is financed, would survive plausible changes in the maintained assumptions.
VI.

Conclusion

Metropolitan job growth "trickles down" to provide long-run benefits for the poor, and
these long-run benefits for the poor are greater in percentage terms than for other groups. But
trickle-down economic development policies may hurt the poor if these policies are too costly or
are financed through cuts in social programs.
The results here would be strengthened by future research that would follow the same
individuals over time, and control for changes in the composition of the MSA population in
examining the effect of job growth. In addition, this research could be extended to examine the
effects of other types of changes in MSA employment, such as shifts in employment across
industries, or the suburbanization of employment.

13

This ignores differences in substitution effects if local business activity is measured by employment, and most state
and local business taxes increase the price of capital. Appendix 2-1 of my book argues that the output effect of local cost
variables probably outweighs the substitution effect.
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Table 1
BASIC QUINTILE RESULTS
FOR LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF 1% SHOCK TO MSA EMPLOYMENT
(1)

Quintile

(2)

% of
Total
Income

(3)
LR %
Effects
on Nominal
Income, 0
lag length

(4)

(5)

LR %
LR %
Effects on Effects on
Quintile
Nominal
Share
Income,
0 lags
10 lags

(6)

(7)

LR % Effects
on Nominal
Effects on
Income, 10
Real Income
lags, % Change 0 lags, 25
at Means
MSAs with
Specification
Price Data

1

3.91%

1.415
(.374)

.719
(.328)

1.086
(.492)

1.025
(.484)

.900
(.346)

2

9.84

.798
(.237)

.108
(.173)

.570
(.313)

.631
(.313)

.667
(.216)

3

16.46

.727
(.194)

.037
(.112)

.594
(.256)

.605
(.257)

.539
(.172)

4

24.96

.755
(.161)

.066
(.086)

.629
(.214)

.615
(.210)

.362
(.150)

5

44.83

.588
(.179)

-.102
(.094)

.287
(.234)

.292
(.241)

.247
(.161)

100.00

.687
(.152)

.471
(.200)

.479
(.202)

.389
(.141)

Average

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimates correct for first-order serial correlation.
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Table 2
EFFECTS OF 1% SHOCK TO MSA EMPLOYMENT
ON VARIOUS TYPES OF INCOME,
AVERAGE EFFECTS FOR ALL FAMILIES

Income Type

% of
Total
Income

Optimal
Lag
Length

Wage and Salary

74.41%

4 Lags

Self-Employment

5.08

0 Lags

.21

0 Lags

6.17

3 Lags

SSI

.29

0 Lags

Public Assistance

.47

0 Lags

1.12

2 Lags

Child Support & Other 1.28

0 Lags

Interest

4.58

2 Lags

Dividends/Rents

2.32

0 Lags

Retirement

4.07

2 Lags

Farm
Social Security

UI/Vets

Total

100.00%

0 Lags

Optimal AIC Results
Short-Run Long-Run
1.098*
(.280)
.728
(.897)
3.939
(5.090)
-.097
(.535)
-1.544
(1.313)
-1.282
(1.034)
-3.398*
(1.382)
-2.628*
(.994)
-2.316*
(.980)
1.382
(1.181)
.089
(1.055)
.665*
(.153)

1.138*
(.209)
.728
(.897)
3.939
(5.090)
-.909*
(.398)
-1.544
(1.313)
-1.282
(1.034)
1.347
(.920)
-2.628*
(.994)
-.677
(.647)
1.382
(1.181)
-1.342*
(.727)
.665*
(.153)

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients with T-statistics greater than 1.645 in absolute value are
indicated with an asterisk. Short-run results are immediate effects of this year's employment shock. Long-run
results are the sum of the coefficients on all employment variables included in the optimal AIC specification.
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Table 3
CONTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENT INCOME TYPES
TO MSA GROWTH'S LONG-RUN EFFECTS
ON TOTAL INCOME, LOWEST AND HIGHEST INCOME QUINTILES,
10 LAG SPECIFICATION
Income Type

Lowest Income Quintile

Average Family

Highest Income Quintile

Wage & Salary

(.3854) (2.447)* = .943

(.7441) (.867)* = .645

(.7837) (.664)* = .520

Self Employment

(.0151) (10.116) = .153

(.0507) (.829) = .042

(.0689) (.521) = .036

= .036

(.0021) (4.493) = .010

(.0028) (2.563) = .007

Farm
Social Security

(.3290) (-.293) = -.096 (.0617) (-1.402)* = -.087

SSI

(.0393) (-.412) = -.016

(.0029) (-1.416) = -.004

(.0004) (.446) = .000

(.0771) (.300) = .023

(.0047) (.363) = .002

(.0002) (-1.542) = -.000

Public Assistance
UI/Vets
Child Support/Other
Interest
Dividends/Rent
Retirement

(.0283) (-.679) = -.019

(.0112) (1.769)* = .020

(.0451) (-1.678) = -.076 (.0128) (-2.513)* = -.032
(.0379) (1.069) = .041

(.0458) (-1.071) = -.049

(.0090) (-3.855) = -.035

(.0232) (.068) = .002

(.0358) (1.271) = .046

(.0407) (-1.429) = -.058

(.0158) (-3.025)* = -.048

(.0053) (5.589)* = .030
(.0077) (-5.617)* = -.043
(.0500) (-1.862)* = -.093
(.0342) (-.134) = -.005
(.0311) (-2.931)* = -.091

Summed Total

.999

.490

.313

Estimated Total

1.025*

.479*

.292

Note: First number in parentheses is share of that type of income in total income for the group examined;
the second number in parentheses is the long-run percentage effect of a 1% MSA employment shock on that type
of income for that group. Percentage effects whose T-statistics are greater than 1.645 in absolute value are
marked with an asterisk. The product of these two numbers is the contribution of that type of income to the
percentage change in total income. Because mean farm income for lowest income quintile is negative, effects for this
income type were directly estimated as a percentage of mean total income for that quintile.
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Table 4
OVERALL LONG-RUN DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS
OF 1% SHOCK TO MSA EMPLOYMENT

Quintile

% of
Total
Income

% Effect on
Real Income

Rental
HomeOwnership
Effect

Corporate
Real
Estate
Effect

Non-Corp.
Business Business
Real
Real
Estate
Estate

Total

1

3.91%

.848

.060

.004

.005

.002

=

.919

2

9.84

.462

.051

.006

.007

.005

=

.531

3

16.46

.438

.047

.007

.008

.006

=

.506

4

24.96

.449

.046

.008

.009

.006

=

.518

5

44.83

.180

.042

.016

.018

.010

=

.266

100.00

.343

.045

.011

.013

.008

=

.420

Average

Note: Calculations based on lag 10 specification, with percentage change calculated at means.
Highest income quintile and average real income figures adjusted upwards to reflect top-coding
of 10.15% of wage-and-salary income of top quintile, 2.74% of self-employment income, with
adjustment assuming top-coded income would have increased at similar rate to non-top-coded.
All figures state gains as percentage of that group's base income. Thus, the increase in
home prices provides the lowest income quintile with a capital gain equivalent to a .060%
increase in annual income.
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Table 5
NET DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
UNDER ALTERNATIVE COST SCENARIOS
TAX FINANCING

Quintile

-.24 Tax Elasticity
Gross
Tax
Benefit Cost

TRANSFER FINANCING

TAX FINANCING

-.24 Tax Elasticity
Net
Transfer
Effect
Cost

-.04 Tax Elasticity
Net
Tax
Net
Effect
Cost
Effect

1

.919

-.268

.651

-2.980

-2.061

-1.608

-.689

2

.531

-.200

.331

-.437

.094

-1.200

-.669

3

.506

-.176

.330

-.076

.430

-1.056

-.550

4

.518

-.165

.353

-.023

.495

-.990

-.472

5

.266

-.180

.086

-.007

.259

-1.080

-.814

.420

-.181

.239

-.181

.239

-1.086

-.666

Average

Note: Calculations assume 1% MSA job growth, brought about by a business tax reduction or
equivalent subsidy, and financed by increased personal taxes or cuts in transfers. All costs
and benefits are stated as percentages of that particular group's base income. For example,
under scenario 1, quintile 1 receives income benefits of .919%, pays increased taxes of .268%,
for a net gain of .651%.

